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Public banking institutions have been made and re-made across very different 
historical settings, from ancient Babylon to contemporary Turkey. But aside 
from their capacity to pool and mobilize money, very little connects the public 
banks of today to those of antiquity. Why contemporary public banks emerge, 
what defines their operating functions, and who benefits from public banking 
are context and case specific questions that usually defy generalization. 
There is nothing timeless about these public institutions. Rather, individual 
and collective agents struggle to make and re-make public banks and to 
define their social content, mediated by broader economic systems and socio-
political structures.  
 
So is it in developing countries. These societies’ varied experiences with 
decolonization, state-building and class formation in their transitions to 
capitalism fundamentally shaped the nature of 20th century public banking. 
Likewise, the shift from state-led to market-oriented strategies of development 
continue to shape 21st century public banking.  
 
Such is the case of Turkey. State elites created a wide range of public banks 
that figured prominently in Turkey’s early 20th century transition to capitalist 
development. While retaining control of roughly a third of the banking assets 
today, the original institutionalized mandates of Turkey’s six remaining public 
banks today have become overlaid with neoliberal competitive imperatives. 
This has generated unanticipated and complex social, political and economic 
contradictions that are not easily unpacked by rigid public versus private 
narratives.  
 
Our argument in this chapter is that the historically shifting complexities of 
public banks in general, and Turkey’s in particular, are best understood from a 
social content point of view. We start with a brief historical summary of public 
banking, followed by a discussion of three competing theoretical models for 
understanding bank ownership. We opt for what we call a social content 
perspective and illustrate why we think this helps to overcome otherwise static 
and polarized approaches to banking. We then turn to the case of Turkey to 
interpret the evolving class-based and sometimes contradictory functions of 
public banks in concrete terms. Although problematic, we nevertheless point 
to the potentiality of public banking as an alternative to neoliberal financing 
norms and highlight possible ways to enhance their ‘public’ character.  
  
Public banks in historical context 
 
Public-like banking institutions go back as far as 2400 B.C. In the temples of 
ancient Babylon and Sumer, interest-bearing credit services formed part of 
the society’s political and economic infrastructure. Periodically, over-
indebtedness or sudden natural disasters would threaten financial stability, 
leading monarchs to offer popular debt amnesties (Graeber 2011, 65). 
Similarly so during medieval times. The private Italian bankers systematized 
‘buy now, pay later’ schemes, benefiting from very high interest rates. But in 
times of widespread individual non-repayment due to economic hardships, the 
harsh penalties could lead to popular instabilities. Italian state officials had to 
occasionally provide debt relief from public funds to ensure stability (an early 
precursor to today’s public bailouts). Add to this recurrent private banking 
crashes, and governing officials were desperate for a stable financial 
alternative. This eventually led to the first modern public banks.  
 
The first such bank materialized in Barcelona in 1401 – the Taula de la Ciutat, 
which survived some 450 years in one form or another (Spufford 2014, 245-6; 
Felloni 2005). A second public bank formed shortly thereafter in Genoa in 
1408 – the Casa di San Giorgio – and operated until the early 19th century. 
Not until 1587 did a third public bank emerge in Venice – the Banco della 
Piazza di Rialto – as a response to a succession of private banking failures. 
Subsequently, public banks formed in Amsterdam (1609), Hamburg (1619) 
and Nuremburg (1621). In a rather different context, 18th-century British 
Quakers in the American colony of Pennsylvania founded a public Land Bank 
to collectively service farmers’ credit needs (Rappaport 1996). Any returns 
made in this process were then channelled back into the community’s public 
revenue.  
 
Despite their diversity, these institutions share a common rationale of having a 
financial institution able to function in the public interest (broadly understood), 
rather than for private ends alone. Indeed, the first public banks’ capacity to 
overcome economic instabilities, to offer accessible credits to priority 
economic sectors, and to provide financial services for the state apparatus 
(credits, payments clearing, international exchange, and so on) stand out as 
significant. In this way we can historically understand the emergence of public 
banking. 
 
However, not until the late 19th and early 20th centuries, amid global 
transitions to post-colonial state independence, deepening capitalism and 
expanding socialism, did public banking become more commonplace, 
although for very different reasons. At one extreme, governments sought 
explicit non-market forms of finance to support nationalist aspirations and 
large-scale development projects, be they national capitalist, socialist, fascist 
or imperialist. At the other extreme, locally rooted cooperative banks emerged 
to offer small-scale credits and local developmental expertise (Birchall 2013). 
 
Our interest lies with the numerous examples of public banks in developing 
countries, which materialized in the 20th century with varying ideological and 
operational orientations. For example, following a brief civil war in 1948, Costa 
Rica nationalized its banks to ensure the “democratization of credit” and 
manage national development priorities (Marois 2005). In post-1949 China the 
Communist Party mobilized the People’s Bank (established in 1948) to fund 
public infrastructure and economic development. In 1952 Brazilian authorities 
founded O Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social 
(BNDES), which has since undergone several transformations, depending on 
the political nature of the governing regime (von Mettenheim 2012). During 
the 1960s, Algeria, Libya, Tanzania, India and Egypt all undertook bank 
nationalizations, often intending them to support a national, socialist-oriented 
developmental policy. By the 1970s estimates suggest that in peripheral 
economies 65 per cent of the largest banks’ assets were under public control, 
while in advanced economies public control reached 40 per cent of the 
banking sector (Levy Yeyati, Micco and Panizza 2007, 212). 
 
It is important to elaborate why forms of public banking took root within 
developing market economies. In these societies, the ‘fractional reserve’ 
system served a vital role in enabling private and public banks to accept 
deposits and to then make loans many times over that amount (for example, 
one dollar held in reserves can create 10 dollars in loans). In peripheral 
economies where little excess savings existed, this credit-creating function 
meant banks could respond to a growing structural need within capitalism for 
access to more credit. However, because loans are repaid in the future, they 
carry a risk of non-payment. For private, profit-oriented banks this results in a 
significant pro-cyclical pattern of lending: when economic times are good, 
private banks lend more freely but when times were bad, they tend to restrict 
lending. Empirical evidence suggests private banks are the most pro-cyclical 
of all (Bertay, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 2014). Much as in medieval times, 
public authorities sought extra-market alternatives. 
 
Public banks, even if they charge interest, have not always had a profit 
mandate, and could therefore lend on strategic developmental grounds, 
providing the potential for counter-cyclical lending against the prevailing 
economic tide (Butzbach and von Mettenheim 2014). It is on this basic 
principle that many modern governments have founded public banks; that is, 
to function as powerful extra-market and developmental coordinating 
institutions (Gerschenkron 1962; de Luna-Martínez and Vicente 2012). Public 
banks can fund national development and reach important segments of 
society, like farmers, tradespersons and cooperatives. Private banks often 
refuse to service these segments due to the potential lending costs, long-term 
commitments, and sometimes risky conditions. By contrast, for much of the 
20th century profit-maximization did not define most public banking 
operations.  
 
Competing views on bank ownership in market economies 
 
Contemporary debates on banking and development are far from settled, with 
ownership being one of the most hotly contested issues, particularly in market 
economies. Three competing conceptual views stand out: the ‘private interest’ 
view, the heterodox ‘developmental’ view, and the critical ‘social content’ view. 
The first two share a normative concern with better managing market-oriented 
capitalism but apply divergent understandings of private versus public 
ownership. The third seeks to interpret public banks within the historical 
specificity of capitalism, with a normative concern for identifying progressive 
alternative practices of social reproduction and the role that democratized 
finance might play therein. 
 
‘Private interest’ views 
 
Private interest views of banking are rooted in liberal conceptions of individual 
human nature and neoclassical tenets of the benefits of market competition. 
From Hobbesian notions of power-hungry individuals, Lockean edicts tying 
private property to liberty, and Smithian doctrines espousing free-exchange 
and individual competition, contemporary theorists hold fast to an underlying 
ideological proposition that states must not interfere with an individual’s 
private property or the market’s competitive functioning. Hayek (1984, 381) 
synthesized this liberal tradition, arguing that the coercive functions of 
government must be guided solely by concern for preserving peace, justice 
and liberty.  
 
Liberal political economy is thus premised on the societal benefits of formally 
separating the public and political from the private and economic. The 
theoretical deductive method by which these a priori individualist foundations 
are reached subsequently render liberalism a pre-social theorization. 
Neoclassical economics, through its methodological individualist and 
deductivist approaches, is ideologically commensurate with these ideals (see 
Lawson 2013; Solomon 2010, 130-34). This ideological lineage enables 
conventional economists to assert that private ownership is inherently 
superior to public, driving innovation and guarding against corruption (Mishkin 
2009; Shleifer 1998; Vanberg 2005). It follows that the “fundamental political 
institutions” of society are said to include universal private property 
protections and market enhancing frameworks (Calomiris and Haber 2014, 
12-13, 35). This forms the backbone of neoliberalism in general and of private 
interest views of banking in particular. 
 
The private interest view therefore holds that attaching anything socially 
progressive to public bank ownership is idealistic and naïve (Barth et al. 2006, 
34-5). Rather, socially desirable ends are best reached via private actors in 
the competitive market; governments can at best regulate this, but ought 
never to interfere by directly owning banks (Barth et al. 2006, 14; World Bank 
2012). This view has informed three decades of neoliberal financial policy 
formation, despite meagre evidence. For example, the World Bank’s Finance 
for Growth report (2001, 123) stated that, “[w]hatever its original objectives, 
state ownership tends to stunt financial sector development, thereby 
contributing to slower growth.” Four pages later, however, the report admits 
that, “[u]ntil recently, the primary evidence on this issue [i.e. government 
failure in finance] has been anecdotal” (World Bank 2001, 127; emphasis 
added), despite two decades of bank privatization advocacy. In this paradigm, 
the credibility of banks is a priori determined according to ownership form. 
Moreover, why societies might promote or preserve public banks is likewise 
seen as a matter of predetermined knowledge: governments control banks for 
corrupt political and personal gain (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
2002, 266; World Bank 2012, 117). The nuances of history are lost to such 
pre-social theories. 
 
 
 
 
Heterodox ‘developmentalist’ views 
 
Heterodox developmental views of banking, by contrast, are generally 
connected to Keynesian, Weberian, and institutionalist approaches. 
Advocates of this broadly defined perspective support the state’s extra-market 
coordinating capacities as necessary for managing the instabilities of capitalist 
development. John Stuart Mill imputed a strong normative orientation, arguing 
that state intervention and redistributive measures were needed to mitigate 
(though not eliminate) class domination within emerging capitalist relations.  
 
For much of the 20th century public ownership and the ‘machinery of 
government’ figured prominently in heterodox perspectives. The belief that 
state institutions, like public banks, ought to pursue long-term developmental 
and socially beneficial goals dominated (Öztürk, Gultekin-Karakas and 
Hısarcıklılar 2010). Historically, this approach highlighted the scarcity of 
capital in developing countries and the unlikeliness that private banks would 
willingly fill the gap, thus necessitating public banking for developmental goals 
(Gerschenkron 1962). 
 
More contemporary neo-Keynesian approaches have largely jettisoned 
concerns of class inequality (and often reject public ownership), focusing 
more on how state institutions may best manage capitalism. State–society 
relations are seen as separate spheres of existence, where the state 
maintains an independent and elitist rationality, concerned with capitalist 
development and social inequality in ways that are seen to transcend the 
competing desires of individuals and markets (Evans 1995; see also Selwyn 
2015). As a result, some developmental economists have largely dropped 
calls for public banking, focusing instead on bolstering the state’s regulatory 
capacity (Spratt 2009).  
 
Since the 2008-2009 crisis, however, there has been renewed interest in 
public banking to support development goals (Culpeper 2012; Marshall 2010), 
although these heterodox developmental views still tend to essentialize public 
bank ownership as a rational, elite-driven program that supports an otherwise 
neoliberal market order. Socially progressive and substantively democratized 
goals tend to be obscured in this neo-developmentalist view. 
 
Critical ‘social content’ view 
 
A third approach to bank ownership is one that historicizes banking 
institutions and their operations within the context of capitalism. We refer to 
this as a ‘social content’ view, drawing on a diverse historical materialist, and 
largely Marxist, body of scholarship (see Hilferding 2006 [1981]; Lenin 2011 
[1964]; Marois 2012, 24-35). In this approach, we recognize that the role of 
banks in society long pre-dates capitalism (as noted above). Accordingly, a 
social content approach does not take banks as unmediated institutional 
derivatives of capitalist processes, and not everything about banks is 
explicable vis-à-vis capitalism’s competitive imperatives and exploitative class 
relations. Different types of gendered and racialized forms of power and 
privilege find their way into banking institutions and their operations (Dymski 
2009; Roberts 2013). These intersecting social forces are impacted by the 
evolving structural context of capitalism and in turn define the social logic of 
the market. 
 
A distinguishing feature of our social content view is that ownership category 
alone does not determine how banks act (or more precisely, their personnel, 
managers and owners). Rather, all banking institutions are historically and 
socially constructed: “banks are institutionalized social relations that reflect 
historically specific relations of power and reproduction between the banks, 
other firms, the state, and labor in general” (Marois 2012, 29). These 
institutionalized social relationships are influenced by, but not limited to, the 
wider class relations specific to capitalism that impart a competitive social 
logic onto, without determining, individual banking operations. In short, 
individual and collective agencies shape the world around us, but not, to 
paraphrase Engels (1959, 230), in the conditions of our own choosing and not 
always as intended. Institutions, banks included, take form as complex 
hybridizations of social struggles that seldom correspond to any idealized 
notion (see Jessop 2002, 453; Peck, Theodore and Brenner 2012, 271). The 
momentarily fixed but fluctuating context-specific institutional forms assumed 
exist within global neoliberalization processes involving historically specific 
waves and patterns of market-disciplinary regulatory restructuring (Peck et al 
2012, 268).  
 
Consequently, in a social content view, all banks, be they public or private, 
are institutionalized varieties of neoliberalized banks today. Given our focus 
on public banks, the theoretical, methodological and political challenge is to 
investigate how specific and variegated cases are constitutive of a 
generalized system of neoliberal social rule while simultaneously constituting 
potentially significant sources of social power capable of facilitating a break 
with neoliberalism.  
 
Turkey’s public banks, as a particular form of banking, must therefore be 
assessed in their own historical terms and as reflecting often contradictory 
power dynamics and practices of material reproduction that may offer 
significant possibilities for breaking with neoliberal capitalism. It is to this 
context-specific study that we now turn. 
 
A history of public banks in Turkey 
 
In Turkey, as in many other peripheral societies, finding capital to fund the 
transition to post-colonial capitalism was a challenge, especially if trying to 
avoid deepening foreign bank dependence. One solution involved official 
support for domestic banks, public and private, given their capacity to pool 
and mobilize money as loanable capital. But as local private banks emerged 
they were often too small or too integrated into specific industries to effectively 
fund other developmental projects and public infrastructure. Contrary to pre-
social neoclassical ideas, many private banks were basically unwilling and 
unable to respond to Turkey’s financial needs (see Kuruç 1987). 
Consequently, the transition to capitalism generated a need for Turkish 
authorities to establish public banks (mostly large state-owned and deposit-
taking commercial banks, see Table 1), which subsequently assumed an 
active and influential role in state- and market-building processes via 
politically determined developmental missions (Öztürk et al 2010, 161). 
 
Table 1: Public commercial banks in the early Turkish Republic 
 
Public bank Year 
established 
Development mission or target funding 
 
Ziraat Bank 1863/1888 Agriculture 
Emlak Bank 1927 Home mortgages and real estate loans 
Sümerbank  1933 Other state-owned enterprises and 
industrialization 
Belediyeler  
Bank 
1933 Municipal infrastructure projects such as 
water, electricity, drainage, and the 
preparation of building plans 
Etibank 1935 Electrical power generation capacity and the 
financing of mining and mineral marketing 
Denizbank 1937 Maritime development 
Halkbank 1938 Cooperatives, artisans, tradespersons and 
small-scale producers 
Sources: BAT 1999; BAT 2009. 
 
During the mid-1940s and 1950s, Turkey’s Democratic Party government 
encouraged private banking as part of an economic liberalization experiment. 
Frustrated by poor results, however, authorities decisively turned to a state-
led developmental strategy in the 1960s. The new State Planning 
Organization (established in 1961) worked in tandem with 10 different public 
commercial banks and three development banks (constituting about 70 per 
cent of all banking assets) to coordinate investment, decide on subsidized 
credits, back new industrial investments and state-owned enterprises, and 
allocate foreign exchange according to Five Year Development Plans (Aydın 
2005, 34-5; Keyder 2000, 204; Marois 2012, 55-6). For decades, these public 
banks fulfilled their developmental mandates, sustainably managing any 
assigned ‘duty losses’ [defined as a claim on the Turkish Treasury derived 
from officially subsidized lending and the accrued interest (BAT 2001)] – that 
is, until Turkey’s 1980s turn to neoliberalism. 
 
Neoliberal restructuring of Turkey’s public banks 
 
By the mid- to late-1970s the so-called golden age of state-led capitalist 
development was in decline internationally. A series of oil shocks had hit the 
global economy and the US suffered from both high inflation and recession. In 
response, the US Treasury allowed domestic interest rates to soar, causing 
interest rates around the world to rise to 20 per cent or more. The consequent 
1980s debt crises that erupted across the developing world helped pave the 
way for neoliberal structural adjustment processes globally (Glyn 2006).  
 
Turkey was not exempt from this neoliberal transition (see Yalman 2009). The 
public banks’ profitability and stability had begun to erode in the late 1970s, 
and authorities started to once again envision a greater role for private 
banking and finance in the country. The 1980s opened with a military coup 
and an authoritarian transition. Despite some initial rapid liberalization 
measures (triggering a costly banking crisis in 1982), authorities attempted no 
major bank ownership shifts. Over the next 20 years public bank control fell 
only by 6 per cent, from 45 per cent in the early 1980s to 39 per cent in the 
late 1990s (private domestic banks assets, correspondingly, grew from 44 to 
50 per cent) (BAT 1999, 24). 
 
But as the phase of capital accumulation shifted to neoliberalism so too did 
governing authorities’ move away from public banks’ developmental 
mandates, with lasting consequences. Amid the turbulent mid-1990s – 
characterized by recurrent financial crises in the global South – Turkey’s 
coalitions began using public banks to hide government budget deficits 
(BRSA 2003, 10; OECD 1999, 57). Public bank duty losses exploded from 2.2 
per cent of GNP in 1995 to 13 per cent in 1999 (from $2.77 billion to $19.2 
billion) (World Bank 2000, 96). Far from being meant for developmental 
ideals, Turkey’s neoliberal advocates used the public banks to help smooth 
the country’s socially volatile transition to neoliberalism (Ergüneş 2008; 
Marois 2012, 205).  
 
The exposure of public banking losses, and the increasingly speculative 
practices of private banks, triggered Turkey’s own major financial crisis in 
2000-2001, which opened a new phase of neoliberal deepening (Akyüz and 
Boratav 2003). It took $22 billion in public funds to cover the public banks’ 
‘neoliberal’ duty losses and $25 billion in public money to bail out the failed 
private banks, for a total of $47 billion in publicly socialized losses, equalling 
roughly 30 per cent of 2002 GDP (Marois 2011, 178).  
 
The ensuing 2001 Banking Sector Restructuring Program (BSRP) brought 
structural changes to the social content of banking in Turkey. For the public 
banks, the BSRP established a two-stage restructuring project that involved 
immediate financial reorganization and ongoing operational restructuring 
around market efficiency and profitability imperatives (see BRSA 2002; Marois 
2012, 172-177). The political goal was for public banks to institutionalize 
private sector profit-maximizing behaviour, with the intent to privatize them 
within five years. More than a decade later, market-oriented restructuring has 
had the unintended consequence of making public bank functions vital to the 
reproduction of Turkish neoliberalism.  
 
Turkey’s public banks today 
 
As of 2015 there were six majority controlled public banks remaining in Turkey 
– three large commercial and three small development banks. The three 
commercial banks (Ziraat, Halkbank and VakıfBank) are among the top 10 
largest banks in Turkey, which in 2014 together controlled 28 per cent of the 
sector’s assets (nearly US$227 billion) (BAT 2014, I-12, II-234). The public 
development banks (Kalkınma, Eximbank and İller) control an additional 2 per 
cent of the banking sector’s assets, specializing in development and 
infrastructure funding.  
 
All of Turkey’s public banks are joint-stock companies in which different state 
or governing authorities own controlling shares. Ziraat and Eximbank are fully 
owned by the federal government and the Turkish Treasury holds 99 per cent 
of Kalkınma Bank shares. İller Bank is also fully public but controlled by 
Turkey’s provincial, municipal and village authorities. VakıfBank is a special 
case as a cultural branch of the state, the Foundations Directorate, has 
controlling ownership on behalf of thousands of individual non-profit 
foundations (e.g. heritage sites) and has been partially privatized since 2005. 
Halkbank has had its shares transferred to the state’s Privatization 
Administration (which receives dividend payouts from Halkbank’s yearly 
returns). Two public offerings have sold off almost 50 per cent of its shares.1  
 
In all these cases Turkish state authorities retain controlling shares, and this 
offers a potentially powerful lever of domestic extra-economic coordination. 
Such potentiality is not embodied in public ownership itself but depends on 
the contending, and often contradictory, political struggles and economic 
processes that shape the public banks’ functions. Looking at the period after 
Turkey’s 2001 crisis, and specifically during the 2008-09 crisis, five potentially 
powerful functions are outlined below. These include: extra-market financial 
coordination; support in times of crisis and stability; access to finance; a 
savers’ safe haven that at the same time provides an alternative source of 
funding; and efficiency. The contradictory social content of these functions are 
subsequently highlighted. 
 
Extra-market financial coordination 
 
Through Ziraat and Halkbank in particular, Turkish authorities can direct 
subsidized credits through what is now termed ‘income loss’ payments, which 
are direct government transfers made to these banks in compensation for 
providing low interest credits (PER 2008, 15). For example, in 2004 the AKP 
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or Justice and Development Party) government 
sought to boost agricultural production by enhancing financial supports. To 
this end the government permitted Ziraat to reduce certain agricultural interest 
rates by 25 to 100 per cent of the market rate, compensating the banks for the 
‘income losses’ this entailed (PER 2008, 134). Ziraat’s income loss transfers 
reached TL565 million in 2011 (roughly $340 million) (PER 2012). These 
supports, as but one part of a complex set of inputs, helped farmers to more 
affordably invest in increasing productive capacities. The direct government 
transfers, at the same time, kept the public banks on sustainable financial 
footing. Halkbank, too, offers subsidized credits to cooperatives, small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs), trades, and so on to help boost domestic 
production. Halkbank income losses reached nearly TL250 million (roughly 																																																								1	For	details	on	bank	privatizations,	see	the	Turkish	Privatization	Administration	website:	
$150 million) in 2011. Cheaper loans help these businesses fund 
technological upgrades and productive expansion, giving them a competitive 
edge.  
 
It is worth noting that the Treasury’s loss payments represent the subsidized 
interest rate costs alone, so the actual credits granted by the banks are 
considerably greater than the income loss amounts noted above. While such 
support can flow through the private banks, the geographical reach, 
institutional structure, and funding expertise of Ziraat and Halkbank enable a 
smooth roll out of these supports.  
 
The public banks can also support long-term infrastructure financing. For 
example, Halkbank can offer subsidized loans to municipalities with a letter of 
guarantee from the public development bank, İller Bank. In such cases, 
Halkbank may neither receive an official subsidy nor make a return on the 
loan; rather, Halkbank can cross-subsidize the cost from earnings made 
elsewhere (confidential author interview, Halkbank, senior regional manager, 
June 2013, Samsun). In such ways political authorities can directly intervene 
in the provisioning of credits to priority sectors. 
 
Support in times of crisis and instability  
 
The extra-market coordinating capacity of public banks can become strikingly 
apparent in times of crisis and instability, especially if private banks withdraw 
lending and call in existing loans to protect profits and reduce risks (as 
occurred during the 2008-2009 crisis in Turkey). By contrast, Turkey’s public 
banks – including Ziraat, Halkbank, VakıfBank, İller and Kalkınma – acted 
counter-cyclically by expanding their loan portfolios in response to the crisis. 
For example, from September 2008 to June 2009 (the peak of the crisis) 
Ziraat offered TL5 billion of a total TL7.5 billion in new loans (from both public 
and private banks combined) while also offering special repayment terms 
(Ziraat 2010, 13-14, 27). In 2009, VakıfBank (2010, 18) reported increasing 
loans by 13.22 per cent, and Halkbank (2010, 5) by 25.6 per cent. Ziraat’s 
General Manager, Can Akın Çağlar, wrote in the bank’s Annual Report that 
this was a matter of “social responsibility … in order to minimize the pressures 
of economic recession on our farmers” (Ziraat 2010, 14).  
 
Likewise, Halkbank senior management directed branch managers to 
increase lending and to support Turkey’s substantial SME sector (confidential 
author interview, June 2013, Samsun). Public banks can also offer unique 
support at times of individual crisis. According to one Ziraat branch manager, 
the private banks have few loan limit ceilings and they charge much higher 
interest rates, whereas Ziraat sets limits and charges lower rates; moreover, 
when people have trouble repaying their loans, Ziraat does not immediately 
repossess their property but “allows people time to sort out their problems” 
(confidential author interview, April 2013, Istanbul).2 In other words, corporate 
profit imperatives are not always the be-all and end-all of banking operations, 
even under neoliberalism. 																																																								
2 See Önal (2013) for a discussion of related changes in the agricultural loan market. 	
 
Access 
 
While many developing countries today struggle with providing access to 
credit and payments services on a smaller scale outside urban centres – apart 
from the recent, costly and ethically questionable private micro-finance 
schemes (see Bateman 2010) – Turkey’s public banks have been present in 
towns and villages for decades. Nearly 3,400 branches help constitute a 
nationwide financial infrastructure, notably providing rural services that most 
private banks, and especially foreign banks, eschew due to fixed capital and 
staff costs. More than 400 Ziraat branches are in small localities where no 
other banks are present (Ziraat 2010, 23-4). At the same time, state 
authorities make use of Ziraat’s infrastructure to distribute various social 
supports, pensions and payments to individuals nationwide, without having to 
pay commissions to the private banks. Extra-market coordination and support 
in time of crisis go hand in hand with physical accessibility and social benefits. 
 
A saver’s safe haven and alternative funding 
 
Turkey, like most emerging capitalisms, has had its share of banking crises 
and is prone to financial instability. Consequently, people often turn to public 
banks as safe havens for their savings because of implicit or explicit state 
guarantees backing public banks. It follows that public banks can attract high 
levels of individual deposits. This was evident during the 2008-2009 crisis: 
Ziraat’s deposits grew by 17 per cent (2010, 14), Halkbank’s by over 9 per 
cent (2010, 5), and VakıfBank’s by over 13 per cent (2010, 18). In 2013 
Turkey’s public banks reported handling over 70 million savings accounts, 
which is nearly half of all the bank accounts in Turkey (BAT 2014, II-242). At 
the same time the public banks’ deposit base is augmented by state 
authorities requiring Turkey’s public sector entities to channel deposits and 
payments through them. In total, domestic savings can offer up to three 
quarters of the public banks’ funding base, constituting an important source of 
capital less reliant on world market booms and busts (BAT 2009, 71-4; BAT 
2012, I-6). 
 
Efficiency 
 
Historically, Turkish public banks have been financially efficient, earning 
returns on assets (ROA) of around 1 per cent prior to the 1980s (BAT 2009, 
98; 183). The neoliberal transition brought peaks and valleys but the public 
banks maintained an average of one to two per cent ROA until 2001. Since 
2001 they have oscillated between 1.5 to 2.5 per cent ROA, equalling or 
bettering the private banks’ ROA levels of 1.3 to 2.4 per cent, while pulling in 
billions in extra public revenue (BAT 2002-2014 various years).  
 
As a former Undersecretary of the Treasury once acknowledged, the 
economic sustainability of Turkey’s public banks undermines much of the 
mainstream case for bank privatization in Turkey (confidential author 
interview, August 2007, Ankara). Indeed, recent empirical analyses of 
Turkey’s private (foreign and domestic) and public banks suggest that the 
latter are the more ‘efficient’ banks (Aysan and Ceyhan 2010; Kök and Ay 
2013). The public banks, moreover, duly pay their taxes and recycle their 
earnings back into public revenues thereby having helped to reduce Turkey’s 
public debt by a range of 0.6 to 1.2 per cent per year from 2006 to 2010 (IMF 
2012, 63). From this vantage point, public banks can offer a cost-efficient and 
powerful public policy tool. 
 
The social contradictions of Turkey’s public banks 
 
These functions performed by Turkey’s public banks are not without social 
and class contradictions. From the perspective of the average household, 
SME or farmer, the public banks’ extra-market financial coordination and 
support at times of crisis may be the difference between survival and 
destitution. This is a genuinely socially progressive function, and one that 
neoliberals abhor, fearing distortions in market-based creative destruction 
processes. Yet from the systemic vantage point of capitalist reproduction, 
such supports may also offer the most fiscally cost-effective way of 
maintaining the legitimacy of neoliberal development strategies, given the 
specificity of Turkey’s volatile peripheral political economy. For private banks, 
increased public bank lending during a crisis releases pressure on them to 
lend and better protects their own returns. For the current neoliberal 
authoritarian ruling AKP government, the public banks have been used to 
push their conservative agenda (via, for example, opening new Islamic 
lending branches) but without democratizing the public banks’ operations. 
 
Issues of access and savers’ safe havens are likewise socially contradictory. 
People require credit and payment services to participate in contemporary 
society, in addition to needing a safe place to secure whatever money they 
might possess. Yet saving integrates and implicates individuals and 
households into the prevailing strategy of financial development in ways that 
engrain creditworthiness and debt discipline. Moreover, banking systems in 
developing countries can and have been used to transfer money resources 
from the already capital poor areas (rural, farming) to already capital rich 
areas (urban, industrial) in support of capital accumulation. Ziraat Bank, for 
example, has opened a new ‘gold savings account’ to draw in traditional 
‘under the mattress’ savings held in real gold in order to draw these private 
resources into market processes. Finally, the mass of deposits held in the 
public banks have gone to easing periods of neoliberal crisis as they erupt, 
thus helping neoliberal social rule overcome periods of economic and social 
uncertainty. 
 
Under neoliberal finance capitalism, therefore, public banks are Janus-faced. 
On the one hand, there is no doubt that public banks offer important functions 
often unavailable from private banks, and these can have real and significant 
benefits for individuals, households, firms, and even society at large. Yet on 
the other hand, by helping to overcome the instabilities and inequalities 
generated by capitalism, public banks help reproduce the exploitative social 
conditions of capitalism that have led to the very problems that public banks 
are called on to help resolve. This appears to be the case in Turkey since 
2001, where political struggles over the social content of the public banks 
appears to have yielded a cost-effective solution to reproducing unequal class 
relations.  
 
Yet the story does not end here, for the social content of public banks remains 
malleable, even if in the current historical conjuncture this content is heavily 
subject to neoliberal rule. 
 
The struggle for public banking alternatives 
 
The functions of Turkey’s public banks have evolved over time, given the 
specificity of Turkish society and the shifting structural context of capitalism. 
Almost certainly the public banks will further evolve, and their social content 
will remain open to contestation.  
 
The stakes are high. The current phase of neoliberal finance capitalism in 
societies such as Turkey acts against popular and working class aspirations 
because the interests of domestic and foreign financial capital are deeply 
fused into the state apparatus, guiding the priorities and actions of state 
managers and government elites, often to the detriment of labour (Marois 
2012, 10). This defining social content represents the culmination of three 
decades of anti-worker and finance-led neoliberal transformation processes. 
This, too, has influenced the public banks to the extent that they can help to 
reproduce finance capitalism and associated class relations in their very 
functioning, despite offering important economic respite to individuals, 
households, farmers, cooperatives, and SMEs. These contradictory functions 
belie any strict correlation with either developmental or private interest 
theories of bank ownership. 
 
Adding further complications and contradictions, the ruling AKP government is 
firmly committed to privatization, having sold off far more SOE assets in the 
first years after coming to power in 2002 than all Turkish governments in the 
previous 20 years combined (Öniş 2011), although the trend has been slow in 
the banking sector. While partial bank privatizations have occurred, the state 
retains controlling ownership levels over all the public banks. The main 
opposition, the centrist CHP, has a party program critical of the AKP’s rapid 
privatizations but nonetheless supports many SOE sell-offs (if they appear to 
increase efficiency and competition in neoclassical terms). That said, the 
public banks generate a lot of public revenue and offer an important economic 
stabilizing force. Any government, however neoliberal, will find it difficult to 
privatize their public banks in this context. It is perhaps through these 
contradictions that the public banks – given their substantial institutional and 
material capacity – prevail in neoliberal Turkey. 
 
This raises an important question for progressive social forces: Should public 
banks be defended? From a critical social content view, the answer is ‘yes’, 
regardless of the public banks’ social contradictions. Given the massive 
structural power of global finance today, and its class interests tied to 
reproducing capitalist exploitation, any financial alternative must not be lightly 
discarded. Public banks are potentially significant sources of progressive 
social developmental power. Moreover, should these banks be sold-off to 
private corporate entities then these public bases of material capacity would 
shift to the private sector, which extends and deepens class-based 
competitive profit imperatives in society. It is thus vital that existing public 
banks be defended from their most immediate threat, that is, corporate 
privatization. In today’s context, public banking capacity may well be a 
necessary, if not sufficient, condition of any initial break with neoliberal social 
rule. Their potential, progressive ‘publicness’ may yet need to be reclaimed, 
however. 
 
Drawing on the case of Turkey, we can highlight some additional strategic 
lessons for public banking and alternative finance (see Marois and Güngen 
2013, 19-20). First, any collective defence of public banks must not rely solely 
on legal or constitutional challenges, but must rather seek to build new social 
bases of support. Collective organization within the public banks is one 
example of how to reshape and reclaim the institutionalized social content of 
the banks, especially if done in solidarity with other private banking sector 
workers. Furthermore, because any challenge to the hegemony of private, 
profit-oriented finance will face a well-coordinated and malicious response on 
behalf of capital, political support must be fostered across society. One potent 
means of garnering public backing would be to demonstrate the actually 
existing functions and practices of public banks that support the public good, 
from preferential lending terms to funding public services and infrastructure. 
To this end more research and popular outreach is required.  
 
Perhaps most importantly, the struggle to defend public banks must ultimately 
be a struggle to democratize their social content and institutionalized 
functions. There is no popular benefit in having strong public banks that are 
susceptible to political and personal abuse or that function to reproduce 
capitalist social relations. The struggle for public banks may have to evolve 
into a struggle to supersede public ownership with new forms of collective and 
cooperative bank ownership and control. Here again radical scholarship can 
play an important role in understanding such potential alternatives. Existing 
and potentially progressive public (and cooperative) banking functions need 
excavating, while conventional academic discourses that constrain 
progressive possibilities need demystifying, and practical alternatives to the 
hegemony of private finance and profit-maximization need elaborating.  
 
Any alternative to neoliberal finance capitalism is, of course, a complex and 
multifarious endeavour. Strategizing around the (re)making of public banks 
and their social content is a crucial element.  
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